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Abstract
Modern Web 2.0 pages combine scripts from several sources
into a single client-side JavaScript program with almost no
isolation. In order to prevent attacks from an untrusted thirdparty script or cross-site scripting, tracking provenance of
data is imperative. However, no browser offers this security
mechanism. This work presents the first information flow
control mechanism for full JavaScript. We track information flow dynamically as much as possible but rely on intraprocedural static analysis to capture implicit flow. Our analysis handles even the dreaded eval function soundly and incorporates flow based on JavaScript’s prototype inheritance.
We implemented our analysis in a production JavaScript engine and report both qualitative as well as quantitative evaluation results.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection—Information flow controls;
F.3.2 [Logics and Meaning of Programs]: Semantics of Programming Languages—Program Analysis; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Security
and Protection
General Terms Algorithms, Languages, Security
Keywords information flow control, implicit flow, hybrid
program analysis, eval, unstructured control flow

1.

Introduction

Client-side scripting languages such as JavaScript are ubiquitous in modern, internet-connected computing, but pose
a serious security risk to the client. In particular, the widespread inclusion of third-party scripts into major websites in∗ This
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creases the risks of malicious scripts interfering with the desired behavior of a page, and consequently puts the browser
in jeopardy. Apart from that, injection attacks like cross site
scripting are still — even after years of research — the
top vulnerabilities on the web.1 While a variety of security mechanisms do exist in current browser environments
(e.g. the “same origin policy”, SSL certificates) these approaches often lack the flexibility necessary to cope with
these real-world threats. They only protect the client from
executing scripts, or isolate scripts in different frames. However, there is almost no isolation between scripts loaded into
the same browser frame, and the user has no control over
how confidential information is processed once it has been
inserted into the system. Furthermore, traditional measures
fail to fully account for subtle threats posed by JavaScript,
such as unwanted information access, as in cross-site request
forgery (CSRF) and cross-site scripting (XSS). Information
flow control (IFC) is a technique to ensure that confidential information cannot illicitly leak to unauthorized output
channels, and to enforce that untrusted data may not influence critical computation. To that end, it needs to track explicit flow, which arises due to computations being dependent on the values of their parameters, and implicit flow,
which arises from predicates that control the execution of
certain code blocks. For example, in Figure 1, the predicate
i & 1 has explicit flow from the parameter i. Depending on
the value of predicates i & 0, one of the return statements is
executed, so both have implicit flow from this predicate.
IFC can be enforced in static, dynamic, or even hybrid
ways. As JavaScript is an extremely dynamic language,
static analyses needs to be very conservative or make assumptions that are not satisfied in practice. Dynamic IFC
on the other side is precise with respect to explicit flow,
and has been shown to be able to enforce security properties like noninterference [3]. The downside is that dynamic
IFC suffers from a lack of theory on how to account for
implicit flow when a language offers features like break,
continue, return, and try ... catch ... finally
blocks. Therefore several dynamic analyses for realistic languages have resorted to static analysis (e.g. [6]). However,
1 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2010-Main

JavaScript’s eval function, that takes a string argument and
executes it as code, can dynamically alter control flow and
thus renders even local static analysis challenging.
Besides, dynamic IFC has long been considered infeasible as information flow control is not a property, i.e. it cannot be characterized by analyzing a single execution in isolation [17], which dynamic analysis is based on. Ignoring
alternative executions (e.g. the other branch of an if-block)
may lead to omission errors, where implicit flow occurs
because there was no information flow in the intercepted
trace. However, recent research found techniques to conservatively reject programs that try to transmit information using these channels. For example, Zdancewic [22] proposed a
no-sensitive-upgrade check, which only allows assignment
to variables that have a security level at least as high as the
level of the predicate that governs the assignment. This prevents upgrading of variables in only one branch of execution. Austin and Flanagan [3] show that this check suffices
to guarantee non-interference, which stipulates that no secret
input of the program may influence public output.
Finally, the extremely dynamic nature of JavaScript imposes several subtle dependences that need to be considered
in flow tracking. In particular, dynamic dispatch uses dynamic lookup to determine the closure to be invoked, and
thus information flow control needs to account for the prototype chain of the receiver object.
This paper presents a novel approach to information flow
tracking, using a hybrid of static and dynamic approaches to
label values during the course of program execution. Our
work dynamically tracks explicit information flow during
execution, as well as utilizing static analysis to support dynamic context tracking for intra- and inter-procedural implicit flow tracking. We elaborate that eval does not interfere
with the local static analysis that determines implicit flow
and define how dynamic lookup needs to be accounted for
in order to track explicit flow faithfully.
We implemented a prototype of this analysis in the production JavaScript engine WebKit, and demonstrate its ability to track information flow inter-procedurally and through
the eval function.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present a novel hybrid information flow analysis that

can handle the full JavaScript language. Explicit flow and
inter-procedural flow are tracked fully dynamically.
• We use intra-procedural static analysis to determine im-

plicit flow even in the case of unstructured control flow.
• We handle explicit and implicit flow of the eval func-

tion that notoriously precludes static analysis or requires
intolerable conservative approximations.
• We present a new technique to incorporate dependences

induced by dynamic lookup and dispatch for prototype
inheritance.

function leakBit(i) {
r = 1;
if (i & 1)
return r;
return 0;
}
s="";
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
s += leakBit(secret = secret >> 1);
s;

Figure 1: Implicit flow due to unstructured control flow.
This example demonstrates the limitation of ignoring control
dependence due to unstructured control flow by tainting only
variables in block scopes with the label of the corresponding
predicate.

while (p1) {
if (p2)
return;
s1; p1 = x > 0;
}

Figure 2: Implicit flow due to unstructured control flow.
This example demonstrates the limitation of ignoring control
dependence due to unstructured control flow by tainting only
variables in block scopes with the label of the corresponding
predicate.
• The proposed analysis has been implemented in a pro-

duction JavaScript engine (sans exception handling), and
we present initial results of flow tracking and runtime
overhead.

2.

Background

Recent work on information flow control for dynamic languages has gone two ways: Either it defined a system for a
theoretic language and proved a security property like noninterference for this system, e.g. [3, 4, 16]; or it defines an
analysis for a realistic language like JavaScript, but remains
rather ad-hoc without security guarantees [18]. The goal of
this work is to merge the two branches of research in order to
achieve sound information flow tracking for the realistic programming language JavaScript. JavaScript is a prototype for
many dynamic languages as it contains the most dynamic
features available to similar languages. Dynamic information flow labeling allows for the tracking of information flow
without requiring the source code to be altered or annotated.
In order to preserve the correctness guarantees provided by
Austin and Flanagan [3], we need to extend their labeling
rules to language constructs that exceed their adapted λcalculus. For example, their references do not model ob-

jects or arrays, which are predominant in JavaScript. Nor
does it cover unstructured control flow and the resultant implicit flow. Fortunately, program analysis has been studying these features and presented theories on how to handle them. In particular, the correspondence between information flow control and program dependence has long been
assumed [10], but only recently been formally proved [19].
This allows us to leverage results from program analysis to
extend theoretical languages such that their security properties carry over to realistic languages. In particular, we know
that explicit flow corresponds to data dependence in program
analysis, which is between an expression that uses a value
and the expression that computed it. And that implicit flow
corresponds to control dependence, which arises between a
predicate that governs whether a certain program path will
be executed, and the statement that executes depending on
this decision.

3.

Information Flow Control for JavaScript

In the following we will elaborate on the analyses to track information flow. In order to have a base implementation that
we can tune and compare to later on, we decided to implement universal labeling semantics [3] where every value in
the JavaScript interpreter has a security label attached. At
present, we encode information flow as a power set of all
possible provenances, which we currently limit to 64. This
allows for efficient computation of least upper bounds as the
join becomes a bitwise OR.
3.1

Explicit Flow

Our system handles explicit flow by updating labels on modified values with the labels of those values that influence the
final result. In particular, the result of an operation like addition is labeled with the join of both operand’s labels. Altering the structure of an object or array by adding or removing
properties results in an update of the object’s label with the
label of the current context, as these changes can be observed
by an attacker.
3.2

Implicit Flow

Theoretical papers on information flow control usually restrict themselves to languages without unstructured control
flow. However, realistic imperative languages predominately
contain some variant of goto like break, continue, throw,
return, or try ... catch ... finally. The implicit flow that arises
from these language constructs must not be ignored, but that
requires control dependence instead of analyzing code block
structure only. In particular, we found that both Vogt et al.
[18] and Dhawan and Ganapathy [8] ignore control dependence due to unstructured control flow by tainting only variables in block scopes with the label of the corresponding
predicate. As an example, consider Figure 2, where predicates p1 and p2 determine whether statement s1 will be executed. As s1 is control dependent on both predicates, it must

be tainted with the join of both labels, however, these approaches only create a security context around the enclosing
control structure, which in this case for the return statement
only comprises the if. As a consequence, statement s1 would
only be in the security context of the while statement, missing the dependence on the second predicate.
In our work we define security contexts independent from
blocks, from a predicate – or more generally an operation
that has more than one successor in the control flow graph
– to its immediate post-dominator [5, 6]. This is equivalent to dynamic control dependence [20]. Generating a postdominator tree for each method requires intra-procedural
static analysis. At runtime a stack of security contexts determines the label currently induced by implicit flow. As in
the work of Sabelfeld and Russo [16] and Austin and Flanagan [3], we utilize this stack to track a history of security
contexts. Whenever a value is created or modified at runtime
its label is joined with the set of labels currently on the stack,
thus propagating implicit flow. We never need access to individual labels on the stack. Therefore, when pushing label
l to the stack we join l to the current label on the top and
push that value as the new top. This guarantees that the top
of the stack represents the join of all implicit flows, avoiding
a linear-time traversal each time we consult the stack for the
current context.
3.2.1

Intraprocedural Context Tracking

Prior to execution we store a table of post-dominators for
each operation within a method’s code block. This table is
generated from the control flow graph using the fast dominator algorithm of Lengauer and Tarjan [12]. During execution we execute some bookkeeping code before each operation to maintain our context stack. At each operation that
has more than one successor in the control flow graph, we
push the label of its predicate onto the stack, together with
the immediate post-dominator for this operation. As every
operation can be an immediate post-dominator, we need to
check whether we reached the operation specified on the top
of the stack, in which case we can pop off the label induced
by the corresponding control dependence region.
3.2.2

Interprocedural Context Tracking

Inter-procedural control dependence is well-known when no
unstructured control flow is possible. In this case, on top of
the branching operations and its respective immediate postdominator the call stack needs to be taken into account.
Fortunately, a branching operation always has its immediate post-dominator in the same method when only structured control flow is possible. If both operations are guaranteed to be in the same method, intra-procedural control
dependence can be extended to the inter-procedural case:
The stack elements need to be extended by the current stack
frame pointer such that when the immediate post-dominator
of a branching point is reached, we can assert that this is not
another iteration of the same method, for example in a re-

begin before_op(vPC, callStack)
if context.top() = (_, vPC, callStack)
then
context.pop()
fi
if isBranching(vPC)
then if
context.top() = (_, idom[vPC], callStack)
then
context.top().first t = label[vPC]
else
context.push(label, idom[vPC], callStack)
fi
fi
end

Figure 3: Algorithm for inter-procedural context tracking. In
this example context is the context stack, vPC the current
instruction pointer, idom the post-dominator table, callStack
the call stack pointer, _ a wildcard, and t = the join-andassign operator on labels.
cursive method. Xin and Zhang [20] show that this information suffices to correctly compute dynamic inter-procedural
control dependence. Figure 3 shows pseudocode for our algorithm to compute the label induced by implicit flow for
the inter-procedural case. Before each opcode, we execute
the macro before_op, which takes the current instruction
pointer vPC, and the call stack pointer callStack into account. First it determines if the current operation is the immediate post-dominator of the branching point that was last
executed. If this is the case, then the top element of the context stack is removed. If the current instruction is a branching point, we need to push the label of the current operation
(i.e. predicate) onto the stack, together with the immediate
post-dominator of this operation, and the current call stack.
As an optimization, we can just join the label with the label
of the top stack element if it already contains the same immediate post-dominator and call stack. Note that within a single
method this approach is equivalent to the intra-procedural
case, as the callStack does not change within a single procedure. The object-oriented and functional nature of JavaScript
necessitates an extension to fully propagate labels: Functions
are first-class objects that have associated labels specifying
by which principal they were installed under which calling
context. Thus a function must execute in a context that contains its label. To that end, we push that label on the context
stack before executing a function, and pop it after returning.
3.3

Exceptions

In practice, realistic programming languages offer ways for
leaving a method abruptly. For example a throw statement in
JavaScript leaves the current method if there is no handler
specified, and resumes execution of a handler in a method
further up the call stack, if available. This semantic invalidates the assumption that a method call is post-dominated by
its succeeding operation, as it is in structured control flow.

Again, results from program analysis can be leveraged to
model unstructured constructs such that assumptions from
structured control flow are not invalidated [1, 9]. In particular, we ensure that each branching operation has its immediate post-dominator in the same method. To that end, each
operation that might throw an exception not protected by an
exception handler receives an edge to a synthetic EXIT node
in the control flow graph whose predecessors comprise all
return statements. Then, a synthetic node is added at the corresponding call site where the predicate checks whether an
exception had been thrown or not. The successors of this
node are the operation succeeding the call in the original
control flow graph, and either a corresponding exception
handler or the EXIT node of the containing method.
3.4

String eval

We handle eval similarly to a function call, however, eval
does not have a function object as parameter, but a string. As
the provenance of the string determines whether it should
be trusted, we apply the label of the string to the context
stack before transferring control. Treating eval equivalent to
a function call is only safe if we can assert that its execution
cannot invalidate the static analysis results of the callee. Fortunately the language definition precludes eval from changing control flow of the enclosing code block other than by
throwing an exception. But an exception needs to be accounted for in any case, as even parsing the string parameter could result in a syntax error. Other ways to change the
control flow, like break, continue, return, or try ... catch ...
finally cannot be injected into the block that is calling eval,
as the specification states that these must be enclosed in a
block “not crossing function boundaries.” Thus eval does not
change the intra-procedural post-dominator function, and as
the correctness of our inter-procedural control dependence
relies only on the fact that a branching operation always has
its immediate post-dominator in the same method – which
we guarantee even for code generated by eval – our analysis
remains sound.
3.5

Prototypes

JavaScript is an object oriented languaged, but it has no
classes or inheritance system. Instead it makes use of prototypes: Each object has a special pointer to a prototype object
(__proto__), and any property lookup that fails is repeated
on the prototype, thus forming a chain of objects that may
be consulted on any lookup. Furthermore, prototypes can be
reassigned, or an object’s prototype can be changed between
lookups. This dynamism creates a difficult situation for information labeling, as any object’s properties can be changed
in subtle ways. Not only can one change the property itself,
but (if it is not defined in an object then) changing the prototype may also change the lookup result. To ensure that values are appropriately labeled, even through prototype chain
lookups, we accumulate labels over the course of a lookup,
and any returned value has the union of these labels attached,

begin getProperty(value, property)
label = new Label
while value do
label t = value.label
if value.lookup(property)
then
return value.lookup(property)
labeled with label
fi
value = value.__proto__
od
end

Figure 4: Algorithm for prototype chain lookup. This is the
pseudocode for the algorithm used to appropriately label
values through prototype chain lookups.
as shown in Figure 4. This is particularly essential for dynamic method dispatch.

4.

Implementation

We instrumented WebKit’s production-level JavaScript engine, JavaScriptCore (jsc). This consisted of creating eight
classes, two for static analysis, three for labeling, two for our
program counter, and a logger for debugging and documentation. We also instrumented eight classes. The Interpreter
class required the most modifications, with instrumentation
in nearly all the opcodes and custom macros for branching
and merging operations. Prior to our instrumentation jsc had
approximately 199,000 lines total lines of code. Our modified version of jsc has about 205,000 lines; this includes
whitespace.
4.1

Static Analysis

JavaScript code is fed into the command-line JavaScript interpreter jsc which then compiles it into a bytecode code
block sent to the instrumented interpreter for evaluation.
Our implementation statically analyzes code blocks before evaluation. The static analyzer is implemented as a
StaticAnalyzer and a FlowGraph class. StaticAnalyzer determines the post-dominators for each opcode in a code
block as discussed in Section 3.2.2 and stores them for access during interpretation. StaticAnalyzer objects are stored
alongside code blocks to avoid repeated generation of postdominator trees, and the analysis is performed immediately
before a code block is executed. At present we do not model
flow due to exceptions and exception handling. We will add
this in the next version of our implementation.
4.2

Labeling

Similar to the labeling technique used by Chandra and Franz
[6], we implement labels with long integers and interpret
the labels as bit vectors representing elements of the power
set of information sources, which forms a totally ordered
lattice. We take each bit to represent a different source and
thus currently can track 64 sources. This representation of

labels makes joining fast, using a bitwise OR. Our labels
are wrapped by the JSLabel class for syntactic convenience.
Each code block carries its source, generally a URL, as an
attribute. Prior to evaluation in the interpreter the sources
are read from the code blocks and pushed to our URLMap
class. This static class is responsible for storing sources
and assigning labels to them. JavaScript values, objects, and
functions are represented in the interpreter by the JSValue
class that represent primitive values and JSCell classes for
JavaScript objects. JSCells can be boxed into JSValues for
a unified data model. We labeled both values and cells,
allowing complete and accurate information flow tracking.
This also required modification of the Register class in order
to propagate labels. A primitive value loses its label when
it is pushed into a register. Thus, the Register class had to
be modified to track these labels when JSValues are moved
in and out of a given register. As previously mentioned, the
URLMap stores the label associated with a code block’s
source. The propagation of labels in the interpreter begins
here; during construction of a new value or cell its label
is set to that of its source. Note that the labels of values
constructed from cells are joined with the cell’s label since
this is a flow of information. In the interpreter labels are
propagated explicitly during evaluation in the opcodes, as
discussed in Section 3.1. That is, a result is labeled with
the join of labels from the values which directly influenced
that result. Finally, any result is labeled with the current
execution context, retrieved from the context stack.
4.3

Execution Context

As discussed in Section 3.2, we call before_op of Figure 3
before each opcode is executed, the second part is only
called before a branching opcode; we implemented these
two functions as macros, and integrated them with the interpreter’s built-in functionality to jump to the next opcode to
be executed. These interact with our ProgramCounter class
which implements a stack of (label, instruction, call stack)
triples. To track the current call stack we use the current register pointer, which slides down and up in memory as calls
are made and return. When a function call is made, the interpreter moves its register pointer down to make room for
function arguments, stores the current instruction pointer as
the return point, and moves its instruction pointer to point
into the called code block. As discussed in Section 3.2.1,
we execute a function in a context that includes the function’s label. To push a label to the stack appropriately we
call OP_BRANCH before passing control to the called function. Because the post dominator of the call opcode is always its immediate successor OP_MERGE will pop appropriately from the ProgramCounter when the function returns.
We also ensure that the called code block has static analysis
information generated before jumping into it.
While our handling of eval is very similar to that of
function calls (see Section 3.4), it is handled differently by
the interpreter. When a call to eval is made the interpreter

1
2

>var passwords =
{ "Hans": "jlasdfj", "Emily": "ajsdfo" };

3
4
5
6

ending. PC has length 0 and head 0x0
undefined (labeled 0x4)
>var user = "Hans";

7
8
9
10
11

ending. PC has length 0 and head 0x0
undefined (labeled 0x4)
>eval("passwords." + user + " == \"" + readline() + "\"");
abc"; passwords[‘Emily’] + "

12
13
14
15
16
17

calling eval + pushing. PC has length 0 and head 0x0
PC has length 1 and head 0x404
popping after eval. PC has length 1 and head 0x404
PC has length 0 and head 0x0
ajsdfo (labeled 0x406)

Figure 5: Information control flow analysis. Example of
correct flow analysis of a script injection attack via string
construction for execution by eval. Comments are shown
in blue and have been added to illustrate the state of the PC
during execution.
passes the string argument to its parser and recursively calls
its execute method on the resulting code block. Similar to a
normal function call, we want eval’ed code to execute in the
context of its string argument. However, unlike in the case
of a normal call, the recursive call to the interpreter returns
control to the same point in the interpreter logic. Thus full
context tracking for eval consists of pushing the label of
the string on the context stack, evaluating the string, and
restoring the previous context stack, which is exemplified
in section 5.1.

5.

Evaluation

Our instrumentation of jsc was evaluated qualitatively to
demonstrate its effectiveness and quantitatively to determine the overhead induced by our flow analysis. Section 5.1
elaborates on a script injection attack example that demonstrates the correctness of our instrumentation and Section 5.2
benchmarks our instrumented jsc against the jsc that ships
with WebKit using the SunSpider-0.9.1 JavaScript benchmarking suite.
5.1

Qualitative Experiment

The following example illustrates the ability of our flow
analysis instrumentation to correctly track flow in a script
injection attack. The attack demonstrated here is similar in
nature to a XSS attack, a significant issue as mentioned in
Section 1. This attack constructs a string from trusted and
untrusted sources that will be executed by eval.
In order to demonstrate this attack, jsc has been modified
to treat readline as an untrusted source giving it a unique
label of 0x400. All other labels are automatically assigned
when a JSValue is created. The initial value is the context
the label is created in, this is the URL the value comes from
or the current PC as explained in Section 4.2. The interpreter

is denoted by a label of 0x4. If the source of the label is
NULL, then a label of 0x2 is assigned. This can happen during
prototype-chain traversal. This means that any label assigned
from a non-NULL source should have a value greater than
0x6. Labels less than or equal to 0x6, i.e. 0x2 and 0x4, or their
combination, can be treated as trusted.
The entire attack is outlined in Figure 5. On line 1 an
associative array, named passwords, is constructed using
a trusted source. This array is assigned a label of 0x4. The
associative array’s label will be joined with the head label,
i.e. 0x0. On line 6 a string is created from our trusted source,
it is assigned the value of “Hans”. This string is treated the
same as the associative array as far as labeling is concerned.
The the attack starts on line 10. The eval statement is
being fed a string that is constructed from two sources, the
trusted source and the readline or untrusted source. eval
evaluates the string as JavaScript. The expression is designed
to validate a user’s password. Using a carefully constructed
string we are able to obtain Emily’s password instead. Our
instrumentation correctly pushes the value of 0x404 onto the
stack as the resultant string is composed of both sources.
After eval terminates, the label at the top of the stack is
popped off. The result of the expression has been correctly
labeled 0x406. One might have expected a label of 0x404, but
this actually comes out as 0x406 as explained above. The 0x2
and 0x4 that comprise the 0x6 portion of the label are treated
as trusted.
The label denotes that the string’s value has been influenced by the sources that correspond with 0x6 and 0x400.
This flow analysis could be fed to a policy mechanism that
would decide how to handle the propagation of trusted or
secure data. This is a straightforward example but it demonstrates some of our implementation’s capabilities.
5.2

Quantitative Experiment

In order to establish the overhead induced by our instrumentation of jsc we compared the run times of ten of the tests
from the SunSpider-0.9.1 JavaScript benchmarking suite.
We selected this suite as it is standard, independent of the
DOM in the browser, and covers a large spectrum of language features. The ten tests were chosen in order to represent the different SunSpider test groups, e.g., 3d, access,
and math. The benchmarks were run on a late 2008 MacBook Pro with a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo and 4 GB of
RAM, using the jsc command-line JavaScript interpreter
and the unix time utility. The times shown are calculated as
user + sys in order to get the actual CPU time spent on execution. Both the baseline and instrumented versions of the
code had just-in-time compilation and computed-goto interpretation disabled. Figure 6 shows the results of the tests;
note that these figures represent the average of ten runs of
each test. The average overhead of our flow analysis was
about 150%, meaning that our implementation took 2 to 3
times longer to execute each test. A small portion of the our
implementation’s execution time was spent performing static

Figure 6: SunSpider Benchmark Results. These results show
the average of 10 runs for each of the listed SunSpider tests.
analysis, as mentioned in Sections 4.1 and 3.2.2; on average
about 0.25% of our execution time was spent in static analysis.

6.

Related Work

Recent academic attention focusses on increasing the security of JavaScript, either by reducing its functionality (for
example Facebook JavaScript or Google’s Caja) or by augmenting the execution environment (e.g. [14].) Other approaches rely on code rewriting (e.g. [21]) to allow for the
instrumentation of dynamically generated code, as well as
changing potentially unsafe operations to only execute after
approval by a security automaton. None of these approaches
takes information flow in to account.
Schneider [17] defines a class of security policies that
base their decisions only on observing the history of steps
in the execution of a program. He establishes that policies
enforceable through such a mechanism are a subset of safety
policies, which reject those programs for which some “bad
thing” happens in the course of execution. Unfortunately, information flow control is not enforceable by such a mechanism.
Li et al. [13] propose an information flow mechanism
to control the flow between mutually untrusting code of
mashups. They statically determine which paths could leak
private data to untrusted output and “fingerprint” these
by their call sequences. All other paths are automatically
deemed benign. The overhead for the static analysis is high,

however, subsequent executions of the same code have very
low overhead. While pragmatic, this approach lacks an argument which security policy it guarantees. In particular, its
disregard of implicit flow allows subversion.
Austin and Flanagan [3] presents two semantics for dynamic information flow label propagation for a version of
the lambda calculus with references, one that assigns labels
explicitly to values and a spare labeling that leaves them
implicit where possible. Our work closely mirrors the former, but introduces mechanisms to handle eval and other
features of a real-world language. Preliminary experiments
suggest an overhead reduction of 50% for sparse labeling.
Their later work [4] replaces the no-sensitive-upgrade rule
with a permissive-upgrade rule that allows for the management of partially-leaked information.
Chandra and Franz [6] use a hybrid of static and dynamic analysis to instrument Java bytecode with labels, respecting both explicit and implicit flows. Their static analysis annotates code with information regarding the action of
both sides of a code branch, instead of the conservative nosensitive-upgrade rule.
Chugh et al. [7] separate programs into statically verifiable components and parts that must be checked at run-time.
Their staged information flow verifier achieves a false positive rate of 33%, but it makes unrealistic assumptions for
their static analysis that allow subverting the system.
Askarov and Sabelfeld [2] deal with enforcing security
conditions over a two-element security lattice in a language
with declassification primitives, as well as eval. They offer
proof that their presented monitor configurations enforce security conditions based on the indistinguishability of initial
memories.
Russo and Sabelfeld [15] compare static and dynamic
flow-sensitive information flow control systems and show
that the fully-dynamic approach (in particular [3]) is not
strictly more permissive than flow-sensitive static analysis [11].
Xin and Zhang [20] develop a mechanism for dynamic
control dependence detection based on immediate postdominator information. While their work does not focus on
information flow, we base our mechanism to handle implicit
flow on their definitions, and adapted their algorithms to
information flow labeling.

7.

Conclusion

This paper presented a novel and complete approach to propagating information flow labels in JavaScript. Our approach
handles explicit flow, including prototype chain lookups, as
well as implicit flow through a hybrid static-dynamic system that tracks the execution context both intra- and interprocedurally. Our context tracking system also handles eval,
executing eval’ed code in the context of the source string’s
label, and we showed that eval cannot invalidate the results
of our static analysis.

We implemented our system in WebKit’s JavaScript interpreter, demonstrating its practicality and real-world application to a production web browser. The experiments demonstrate that this implementation has an average overhead of
about 150%, ranging from 95% to 215%.
7.1

Future Work

While our labeling system solves many issues in tracking
information flow in JavaScript, it is only a starting point for
an information flow control system for JavaScript. A major
consideration is the performance of our system; while our
implementation serves as a proof of concept, none of our
code was written with performance in mind, so there is much
room for speedup. In particular, We assume a significant reduction in overhead could be achieved by a sparse labeling
semantics similar to Austin and Flanagan [3], whose preliminary experiments suggest a 50% overhead reduction.
Like related work [6], we have not addressed the issue of
exceptions in information flow – our static analysis currently
does not treat exceptions. The modification to control flow
caused by exceptions, particularly implicit and unhandled
exceptions, raises several issues with control context tracking that deserve individual attention. Unfortunately, like its
cousin Java, JavaScript has a significant number of operations that might throw an exception under certain circumstances. Including these would make the control flow graph
too dense, which results in too many spurious control dependences and thus legal programs would be rejected due to
spurious implicit flow.
Finally, while we have introduced new approaches to
track information flow in JavaScript, our work needs to be
embedded into a security policy enforcement mechanism in
a browser environment to increase the security of client-side
JavaScript.
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